ABSTRACT Data security and privacy concerns are important issues in cloud storage. In this paper, we propose a verifiable public key encryption with keyword search based on homomorphic encryption in multi-user setting. By employing van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi, and Vaikuntanathan homomorphic encryption, the proposed scheme enables the cloud server to generate an inverted encryption index structure without using a query trapdoor, which significantly improves the efficiency of search. On the other hand, the proposed scheme presents a new authenticated data structure based on the inverted encryption index structure, and shows how to apply it to verify the correctness and completeness of search results. Moreover, the proposed scheme allows multiple users to perform encrypted keyword search over encrypted data. Finally the proposed scheme is proved secure based on the approximate-GCD problem. The experiment results demonstrate the proposed scheme has less computation overhead than the existing schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud has been widely used not only by individuals but also by entrepreneurs because it allows people to manage their data conveniently and at low cost. But meanwhile it incurs some problems in security. The outsourced data have strong privacy and business value, while cloud service provider is semi-trusted. To protect data from leakage, data owners encrypt the data and then store them in cloud. However, the encryption greatly restricts the ability of cloud servers to handle users' requests, such as searching over encrypted data.
To resolve this problem, the notion of the public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) was proposed by Boneh et al. [1] . In the PEKS scheme, a sender uploads an encrypted email to an email server along with an encrypted list of keywords. The receiver sends the desired keyword (denoted as a trapdoor) to the email server, which then tests the encrypted emails for the presence of this trapdoor. Soon afterwards, many intuitions have been proposed to improve upon this construction, and expanded it to the cloud environment (e.g., [2] - [12] ). However, most of the existing PEKS schemes cannot guarantee the completeness of the search results done by the cloud server. If no verification for the completeness of search results is guaranteed, the cloud server might return incomplete search results to save computational resources. The consequence of making decisions based on incompleteness search results could be very serious or even catastrophic.
Because the files and indexes with keywords are encrypted, the cloud server can simply store the encrypted files and indexes in the order as they are received. Considering that a file has more than one keyword, data owners typically encrypt each keyword for each file and upload it. When a user submits a query trapdoor, the cloud server needs to traverse the entire indexes to find the target files, thus its time complexity is O(n * m), where n represent the number of files, m represent the number of keywords for all files in the system. As a result, the efficiency of search is quite low, and it may incur the cloud server not to traverse the entire indexes and return the incomplete search results to save computational cost. Therefore, the index structure should be optimized at the cloud server to improve the efficiency of search. However, in the PEKS schemes, the user must give the server a query trapdoor, the server can test whether the one of the encrypted indexes associated with the files is equal to the query trapdoor. In the absence of a trapdoor, the server is unable to test whether the keywords contained in the two encrypted index are consistent, so that the server cannot rearrange the encrypted index structure.
In the environment of cloud storage, the data owner is eager to share his data with multiple users. In this case, the searchable encryption works for multiple users. However, the most existing PEKS schemes are constructed in single-user setting. It is very clear that the schemes proposed for using in single-user setting cannot be directly and effectively used in multi-user setting because of the increased requirements of the latter. In PEKS schemes that are constructed in single-user setting, data owner can only shares his data with a single user and also only permits a single user to perform encrypted keyword search over encrypted data. While in multi-user setting, such as cloud storage, data owners hope to share their data with multiple users and also permit the multiple users to perform encrypted keyword search over encrypted data.
To tackle above problems, we propose a verifiable public key encryption with keyword search based on homomorphic encryption in multi-user setting. Specifically, our main contribution can be summarized as follows:
(1) We optimize the encryption index structure by employing DGHV(van Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan) homomorphic encryption. In our scheme, the cloud server can generate an inverted encryption index structure without using a query trapdoor, which significantly improves the efficiency of search.
(2) We propose a new authenticated data structure for verifying the completeness of search results based on the inverted encryption index structure, and apply it to generate verification proof for verifying the correctness and completeness of search results.
(3) Our scheme is constructed in multi-user setting, and allows multiple users to perform encrypted keyword search over encrypted data.
(4) Our scheme is proved to be secure based on the Approximate-GCD problem.
(5) We evaluate the performance of our scheme and compare our scheme with the previous schemes in terms of time complexity and functions. The time complexity of single keyword search is reduced to O(m) in our scheme. Experiment results demonstrate the efficiency of search in our scheme is higher than the existing schemes.
The following sections are described briefly as follows. We introduce some important prior works in this domain in Section 2. After that, we introduce some preliminaries used in the paper in Section 3. In the Section 4, we give the formal model of our scheme and a security model as well as the specific construction about our scheme. Then in Section 5, we prove our scheme is secure under the security model. The scheme performance is evaluated in Section 6. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 7.
II. PRIOR WORKS
To enable users search over encrypted outsourced data through keywords without decrypting the data at first, the notion of public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) was first put forth by Boneh et al. [1] and its construction makes use of the construction of identity-based encryption (IBE). Subsequently Boneh et al. [2] presented a more practical scheme which supported arbitrary conjunctive queries (such as comparison search, subset search, etc.). Baek et al. [3] proposed a PEKS scheme with a designated server to remove a secure channel. Camenisch et al. [4] proposed oblivious generation of the keyword search trapdoor to maintain the privacy of the keyword against a curious trapdoor generator. Cao et al. [5] presented ranked searches using multi-keyword over encrypted cloud data and established a variety of privacy requirements. So far, a lot of work has been done to enhance the security and the efficiency of PEKS scheme (e.g. [6] - [13] ).
With the development of encryption search technology, the risk of privacy leakage in the outsourced data has been improved. However the problem of providing secure inquiry service has become another new challenge. Due to the system may occur malfunction or the cloud server might return an incomplete search results to save computational resources, the receiver may receive some incorrect and incomplete search results, so that the receiver may make a wrong decision based on the incorrect and incomplete search results. It could be very serious or even catastrophic. Therefore, we should consider the verifiability of search result. So far, there are many schemes to address this issue, such as the schemes [14] - [22] . However, most of the existing schemes mainly focus on the integrity verification of plaintext data, while there are few verifiable search schemes over encrypted data. When the schemes are migrated to the ciphertext, the schemes are no longer applicable since the ciphertext contains the data owner's private key and the random number. To the best of our knowledge, there are not many verifiable search schemes over encrypted data, and these schemes are devised to verify the correction of search results in single-user setting, and do not consider the completeness verification of search result in multi-user setting. Chai and Gong [23] gave the first verifiable keyword search in symmetric setting. Schemes [24] , [25] presented the fine-grained keyword search schemes through utilizing attribute-based encryption. Sun et al. [26] presented a search result verification scheme in the multi-keyword text search scenario by turning the proposed secure index tree into an authenticated one. Guo et al. [27] put forward a multi-phrase ranked search scheme over encrypted data, which can verify the ranked results and support dynamic update operations. Specially, the aforementioned works are devised in single-user setting.
III. PRELIMINARIES A. APPROXIMATE-GCD PROBLEM
Let λ be a security parameter, ρ = λ, η = O(λ 2 ), and γ = O(λ 5 ). The (ρ, η, γ )-Approximate-GCD problem is defined as follows [28] :
• The (ρ, η, γ )-Approximate-GCD problem: Given polynomially many samples from D γ ,ρ (p) for a randomly chosen η-bit odd integer p, output p, where
:
B. DGHV HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
The DGHV homomorphic encryption algorithm is described as follows [28] :
• ParamGen(λ): Input λ as a security parameter, the parameter generation algorithm sets ρ = λ, ρ = 2λ,
, τ = γ + λ, and outputs public parameters as params = ρ, ρ , η, γ , τ .
• KeyGen(λ): The key generation algorithm first chooses a random odd η-bit integer p where
, relabels so that x 0 is the largest and restarts unless x 0 is odd. Finally the secret key is sk = p and the public key is pk = x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x τ .
• Encrypt(pk, m): To encrypt a bit m ∈ {0, 1}, the encryption algorithm chooses a random subset S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , τ } and a random integer r in (−2 ρ , 2 ρ ), and sets the ciphertext as c = [m + 2r + 2 i∈S x i ] x 0 .
• Evaluate(pk, C, c 1 , . . . , c t ): For a (binary) circuit C ε with t inputs, and t ciphertexts c i , the evaluate algorithm applies the (integer) addition and multiplication gates of C ε to the ciphertexts, performs all the operations over the integers, and outputs the resulting integer.
• Decrypt(sk, c): Input the secret key sk and ciphertext c, the decryption algorithm outputs ((c mod p) mod 2).
C. HOMOMORPHIC HASH FUNCTION
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of order p,
. Then H (b) satisfies the following properties [29] :
Homomorphic: For any two vectors b 1 , b 2 , and random integers r 1 , r 2 , then H (
Collision Free: For any polynomial time algorithm, it is hard to find
IV. A VERIFIABLE PUBLIC KEY ENCRYPTION SCHEME WITH KEYWORD SEARCH IN MULTI-USER SETTING A. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model is depicted in Figure 1 . There are four major entities in this system: key-generation center, data owners, cloud servers, and data users. • Key-generation center. The key-generation center (KGC) refers to a fully-trusted center who is responsible for generating public/secret keys and then sending them to data owners, cloud servers and users.
• Data owners. The data owners refer to a special type of users who create the private/confidential data and then outsource them to cloud servers in an encrypted form so that it can be shared with authorized users.
• Cloud servers. The cloud servers have a huge storage space and a strong computing power to handle and maintain data owner's data. The cloud servers are responsible for producing search results over the encrypted data according to the users' search requirements and then sending the search results to the users.
• Users. Users generally refer to those who have registered to search for encrypted keywords in the encrypted data. Note that every user in this paper has an identity belonging to the public domain.
B. THREAT MODEL
We define that KGC and authorized users are honest but regard the cloud server as ''honest-but-curious,'' which is adopted in related schemes on secure cloud data search [5] , [26] . ''honest-but-curious'' means that the cloud server executes the scheme honestly, but it also tries to analyze the receiving data to obtain extra information with curiosity. According to the available information that the cloud server can gain, we consider the threat model as follows:
employed for keyword search and verification. However, the server do not know the user's secret key so that the server cannot obtain the keywords from the ciphertexts.
C. DEFINITION
When a data owner wants to outsource his data to cloud server, he will first encrypt his file (E(file)) using a standard proxy re-encryption public key algorithm. After appending to the ciphertext PEKS(w i , pk) of each keyword, the data owner will send the following message to cloud server:
Where PEKS is an encrypted algorithm with properties discussed below. This paper focuses on addressing how the cloud server searches all files containing a keyword-search query w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w t ), and user verifies the correctness and completeness of the search result. We omit the discussion of proxy re-encryption. Definition 1: A verifiable public key encryption scheme with keyword search in multi-user setting consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup(1 λ ): After input a secure parameter λ, Setup(1 λ ) algorithm outputs a pair of secret key sk and public key pk.
• KeyGen(1 λ , id): The KeyGen algorithm takes as input a user identity id and 1 λ , then generates a secret key sk id for the user.
• PEKS(w i , pk): The PEKS algorithm produces a searchable ciphertext CT i with keyword w i by a pubic key pk.
• Test(CT i , CT j ): After input two searchable ciphertexts CT i and CT j , the Test algorithm verifies whether the keywords contained in the two ciphertexts are the same. If they are the same, output 1; Otherwise, output 0.
• Z-Index(CT i (i = 1, 2, . . . , m)): After input a set of searchable ciphertext CT i (i = 1, 2, . . . , m), the Z-Index algorithm outputs a Z -Index structure.
• Query(w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w t , sk id ): Given a keyword-search query w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w t ), the Query algorithm calls the PEKS algorithm to generate a ciphertext for each keyword using the secret keys (sk id ), and outputs the ciphertext CT i (i = 1, 2, . . . , t).
• RPGen(CT i (i = 1, 2, . . . , t)): Given the ciphertexts CT i (i = 1, 2, . . . , t) from a user, the server returns a set of encrypted files Rf , where each encrypted file E(file i )) ∈ Rf contains all keywords from w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w t ). Afterwards, the server computes a proof so that a user can verify that all encrypted files included in Rf contain (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w t ) and ensure that no encrypted files that satisfies query keywords (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w t ) is omitted from Rf .
• Verify(Rf , proof ): The Verify algorithm takes as input the Rf and proof , and checks the correction and completeness of the search results. If the results are correct and complete, output 1; Otherwise output 0.
D. SCHEME CONSTRUCTION
Let ParamGen and KeyGen be the parameter generation algorithm and the key generation algorithm from the DGHV homomorphic encryption [28] . A verifiable public key encryption scheme with keyword search in multi-user setting is constructed as follows.
• Setup(1 λ ). The key-generation center (KGC) firstly runs ParamGen to obtain the public parameters params = ρ, ρ , η, γ , τ , and runs KeyGen to obtain sk = p, pk = x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x τ . Then the KGC picks a homomorphic hash H and a collision-resistant hash H 1 :
. Finally the KGC sets the public key pk = (params , pk , H , H 1 ) and sends the secret key sk = sk = p to server through a secure channel.
• KeyGen(1 λ , id). When a user submit his identity id for registration, KGC will choose a random number k i and computer q id = H 1 (id ⊕ k i ) and sends sk id = q id to the user through a secure channel.
• PEKS(w i , pk). Given a keyword w i of the W -bit file, satisfying W η, a user chooses a random subset S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , τ } and a random integer r i , and computes a searchable ciphertexts of w i by using the public key pk and the user's secret key q id as follows.
Thus, the searchable ciphertexts of the keyword w i is CT i = (C i1 , C i2 ).
• Test(CT i , CT j ). After receiving the two ciphertexs (CT i , CT j ), the server verifies whether the two ciphertexts contain the same keyword by the following way.
If w i = w j , it outputs 1; Otherwise it outputs 0. • Z-IndexBuild (CT i (i = 1, 2, . . . , m)). Given the ciphertexts CT i (i = 1, 2, . . . , m), the server calls Test(CT i , CT j ) algorithm to determine whether the keywords in the two ciphertexs (CT i , CT j ) are consistent, where PEKS(w i ) = CT i , so that the server can put the ciphertexts with the same keyword in one line, and build an inverted encryption index structure (see Figure 2 ). Based on the inverted encryption index structure, an authenticated data structure is constructed and initially empty, shown as Figure 3 . The row of the structure denotes the encrypted keyword PEKS(w i ) (where
PEKS(w i ) = CT i ). The column of the structure denotes the encrypted file E(file i )(i ∈ [1, n]). Each row has a vector v
Otherwise, set v ij = 0 (see Figure 3) . Namely, each ''1'' in the v w i is mapped to a encrypted file that contains the keyword w i . And for a vector v w i , then preproof (v w i ) = H (value(v w i )), where value(x) is a function that converts x to a decimal number. Finally the authenticated data structure is formed, which is called Z -IndexBuild, and published as shown in Figure 3 .
• Query(w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w t , sk id ): Given a keyword-search query w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w t ), a user executes the PEKS algorithm to generate the ciphertexts CT i (i = 1, 2, .., t) for each search keyword w i (i = 1, 2, . . . , t) by the user's secret key sk id , and sends the ciphertexts CT i (i = 1, 2, .., t) to the server.
• RPGen(CT i (i = 1, 2, . . . , t)): After receiving the ciphertexts CT i (i = 1, 2, . . . , t), the server tests which PEKS(w j ) in the Z -Index structure is equal to CT i by running the Test(CT i , CT j ) algorithm, where PEKS(w j ) = CT j . Once the server finds t correspondent PEKS(w i ) in the Z -Index structure, the server obtains the subset vectors v w i (i = 1, 2, . . . , t), and uses the bit operation & to compute completeness witnesses
According to the v result , the server returns a set of encrypted files Rf , where each encrypted file E(file i )) ∈ Rf is mapped to 1 in the v result . Namely, each encrypted file E(file i )) ∈ Rf contains all keywords w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w t ). If Rf = {E(file 1 ), E(file 2 ), . . . , E(file l )}(l ≤ t), then the server returns a verification proof = value(v w 1 )||value(v w 2 )|| . . . ||value(v w l ) to the user.
• Verify(Rf , proof ). After receiving Rf and proof , the user finishes the following verification steps. 
1) Check whether each subset vector value(v w i ) is correct as follows.

H (value(v
E. CORRECTNESS AND COMPLETENESS
According to the definition in [30] : For sets S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , . . . , S l , if I = S 1 ∩ S 2 ∩ S 3 ∩ . . . ∩ S l is correct and complete, if and only if the following two conditions hold.
• subset condition:
Thus, the two conditions in our scheme can be described as follows:
Subset Condition: In our scheme, the verification of the equation (3) Specially, assuming CT i and CT j are the ciphertexts for the keywords w i and w j respectively. If w i = w j , then
Obviously, the equation (3) is true.
Completeness: In our scheme, given a query keyword w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w t ) from a user, the server returns a set of encrypted files according to the v result . Namely the server returns all encrypted files whose corresponding positions in the v result are equal to 1, and does not return the encrypted files whose corresponding positions in the v result are equal to 0. If the v result is correct, then the completeness is satisfied. The correction of the v result is guaranteed by the equations (3) and (4). Meanwhile, the verification of the equations (5) and (6) ensures that a user can verify the completeness of search results. Because if the equation (5) holds, it shows that the returned value(v w i ) is correct since the preproof (w i ) is published in the Z -IndexBuild. Meanwhile according to the Rf = E(file i )(i = 1, 2, . . . , l) returned by the server, the user can reconstruct v . If the equation (6) holds, it shows that the reconstructed v is correct, which is equal to the v result . Therefore, our scheme can verify the completeness of search results.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
As for security aspect, we reduce our scheme from Section 4 to the hardness of the Approximate-GCD problem. In other words, randomly chosen a set of integers x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x τ , which are all close to multiples of a large integer p, try to find this ''common near divisor'' p. In order to get a reliable oracle for the least-significant bit through the promised adversary, we describe a random-self-reduction and accuracy-amplification step as in [28] . Therefore, a Binary-GCD algorithm can employ the obtained reliable oracle to find p.
Considering the technical details, our random selfreduction implies a loss in parameters. In particular, the obvious advantage in guessing the encrypted bit in a random ''high ρ -bits noise ciphertext'' can be transformed into the ability to predict reliably the parity bit of the quotient in an arbitrary ''low ρ-bits noise integer''. By adding extra noise we can ''wipe out the traces'' of the non-random noise in the arbitrary input integer. That means the security of our scheme in ''high-noise'' can be reduced to the hardness of Approximate-GCD problem in ''low-noise,'' where the difference between ''high noise'' and ''low noise'' is quite small. Theorem 1: Fix the parameters (ρ, ρ , η, γ , τ ) as in the proposed scheme from Section 4 (all polynomial in the security parameter λ). Any attack A with advantage ε on the proposed scheme can be converted into an algorithm B for solving (ρ, η, γ )-Approximate-GCD with success probability at least ε/2. The running time of B is polynomial in the running time of A, and in λ and 1/ε.
Proof: Now we use the same way as [28] to show how the challenger B to recover p with the success probability. We use q p (z) and r p (z) to denote the quotient and remainder of z with respect to p, hence z = q p (z)p + r p (z).
• Step 1. First the challenger B draws (τ + 1) samples x 0 , . . . , x τ from D γ ,ρ (p). It relabels so that x 0 is the largest. It restarts unless x 0 is odd. B outputs a public key pk =< x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x τ > to the adversary A.
• Step 2. B produces a sequence of integers, and attempts to recover p by utilizing A to learn the least significant bit of the quotients of these integers with respect to p. For this, B uses the following Subroutine Learn-LSB Algorithm:
The least-significant-bit of q p (z)
1. For j = 1 to ploy(λ)/ do: 2. choose noise r j
Output the majority vote among the b j 's
• Step 3. Once we turned A into an oracle for the least-significant bit of q p (z), recovering p is rather straightforward. Perhaps the simplest way of doing it is using the Binary GCD Algorithm: Given any two integers z 1 = q p (z 1 )·p+r p (z 1 ) and z 2 = q p (z 2 )·p+r p (z 2 ), B uses the following Binary GCD Algorithm: [28] , with probability at least
. This is contradictory to the condition that the approximategcd problem is difficult.
Although the server has the secret key p, it can learn nothing else about the keyword. For the ciphertexts {C i1 = [w i + r i q id + r i q id i∈S x i ] x 0 , C i2 = H (r i q id )}, since the server does not know the secret key sk id = q id , it cannot obtain any information about the keyword w i . Furthermore, r i is uniformly random and independent over Z * p from server's view, which can ensure the ciphertexts' indistinguishability and enhance the keywords' privacy one step further. Therefore, the server learns nothing more about the keyword w i .
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section mainly evaluates the performance of our scheme inculding the functions, computational cost, index-based searchable encryption schemes comparison and experiment results. Suppose |DO| represent the number of the authorized data owners, n represent the number of data files, and m represent the number of search keywords, t represent the number of queried keywords, d denote the number of search results.
Firstly, we show the functions and computational complexity of our scheme through comparing with other analogous schemes [31] - [33] in Table 1 and Table 2 . Obviously, our scheme enriches the search functionalities over encrypted data. As illustrated in Table 1 , it can achieve aforementioned functionalities simultaneously, while the other three cannot. Our scheme allows the cloud server to generate an inverted encryption index structure without a query trapdoor, which significantly improves the efficiency of searching.
From Table 2 , we can see that KeyGen, PEKS, Test and Verify algorithms in our scheme have lower computational overhead than those of other schemes. Because our scheme adopts a homomorphic encryption and some simple addition, multiplication and division operations, while other three schemes used the cryptography technology, such as bilinear pairing operations. To demonstrate the search efficiency with index structure, we make comparisons with several related searchable encryption schemes [9] , [34] - [36] and the results are displayed in Table 3 . In general, the index structure can be divided into two types: file-keyword and keyword-file, the latter one also named the inverted index. From Table 3 , we can see the search complexity in schemes [9] , [36] and our scheme is smaller than schemes [34] , [35] due to the index structure. In our scheme, we introduce an index structure named Z -Index, which can support keyword search and results verification to ensure correctness and completeness of search results. By comparison, it shows that our scheme has better efficiency when weighing all the factors in Table 3 .
To access the actual performance of our scheme in computational time, we perform the comparison experiments with VMKDO16 [33] over a real-world dataset named Enron email dataset. The experiments are implemented on windows 10 with Inter Core i5 and Processor 2.6 GHz. We set E(F q ) : y 2 = x 3 + x and G 1 is a subgroup of E(F q ), where q is a large prime number. The group order of G 1 is 160-bit, and the base field is 512-bit. The experiment results are shown in Figure 4 , Figure 5 and Figure 6 . From Figure 4 , we can see that the computational time of KeyGen algorithm in two schemes almost linearly increases with the number of DOs (Here we set |DO| ∈ [1, 5000]). We also see that our scheme needs less computational time than the scheme VMKDO16 since our scheme only needs a Hash operation to generate the private key, while the scheme VMKDO16 needs to select 2 random numbers for each data owner and do 2 exponentiation operations to obtain a pair of public-private key of the data owner.
In the PEKS phase, the scheme VMKDO16 firstly needs to encrypt file set F through the traditional public key encryption algorithm, and generate the signatures for the encrypted file set(Here we set m ∈ [1, 1000]). The computational cost of generating the signature for each encrypted file block is an exponential operation. Following the index is built for file set according to the given keyword set. The process mainly involves multiple bilinear pairing and exponential operations. However, our scheme only needs 2 multiplications, 2 additions and a Hash operation to finish PEKS algorithm. Therefore, the computational burden of PEKS algorithm in the scheme VMKDO16 is much heavier than our schemes. The experiment result showed in Figure 5 is consistent with our analysis. Actually, the PEKS algorithm is affected by the keyword number m, and its computational burden becomes heavier with increasing m. However, the performance of our scheme is almost unaffected because the computation burden of addition and multiplication is negligible. In Test phase, Figure 6 shows that our scheme has much less computational overhead than the scheme VMKDO16 when there are fewer search keywords(Here we set t ∈ [150, 750]). But the computational time in our scheme linearly increases with the number of t, while that of the scheme VMKDO16 is almost constant. This is because the scheme VMKDO16 is constructed based on attribute encryption algorithm, so that the number of searching keywords mainly affects the time of trapdoor generation. In the Test phase, no matter the number of keywords, the Test algorithm only needs 3 power exponential operations and 2 bilinear pairing operations. Our scheme is constructed based on Homomorphic encryption algorithm, and the encrypted indexes include keywords, so it will increase linearly with the increase of the number of queried keywords. Therefore, when t is large enough, the scheme VMKDO16 will perform better than our scheme. Fortunately, users generally submit the number of searching keyword is not big. Thus, our scheme is still acceptable in practice, and perform better than the scheme VMKDO16 when there are fewer search keywords.
VII. CONCLUSION
A verifiable public key encryption with keyword search based on homomorphic encryption in multi-user setting is proposed. Our scheme allows the server to build an inverted encryption index structure without a query trapdoor, so that the time complexity of single keyword search is reduced to O(m). Experiments demonstrate it has an obvious advantage than others. Moreover, our scheme can verify the correctness and completeness of searching results in multi-user setting and allow multiple users to perform encrypted keyword queries over encrypted data. Security analysis show it is secure based on the Approximate-GCD problem under random oracle.
